Originally published at: http://users.aol.com/keenlife/stock.htm, © Copyright 1992 Mark Doser. All Rights Reserved.
On October 19, 1987, better known as "Black Monday," the Dow Jones
industrial average collapsed by 508.32 points to close at 1,738.40,
eclipsing all previous records. The Dow had dropped by 22.6 percent, which
was almost twice as much a percentage drop as on October 29, 1929. The
decline in 1929 was 12.82 percent. 608 million shares were transacted that
day on the New York Stock Exchange, nearly doubling the previous record,
set just one trading day earlier, on Friday. Perhaps the worst effect of
"Black Monday" was the fact that the collapse destroyed more than 500
billion in the equity value of U.S.stocks. (Arbel, Kaff 61) This was
especially detrimental to all the elderly people whose pensions funds
depended upon sucessful stock and stock index portfolios.
Since a detailed examination of all events surrounding the 1987 Stock
Market Crash could fill an encyclopedia, this paper will limit it's scope
to the major events of the 1987 crash. It will identify some of the
contributing patterns that led to the crash and the behavior of the market
players, government, media and public at large. This paper will endeavor
to show that exchange markets ignorred warning signs, placed too much
faith in stock options, developed powerful new technologies and strategies
but never created a satisfactory system to administer the market if a
crisis developed. The market has basically forgotten the crash in the near
five years since. Very little changed out of a crisis that could have
destroyed the American economy.
Many different theories as to the causes of the 1987 Stock Market
Crash have been offered. Program trading, index arbitaging and futures
contracts have frequntly been mentioned. Commonly, these all fall under
the term "portfolio insurance." Portfolio insurance was supposed to be a
way to protect the value of the stock that you own (or more likely, manage
for somebody else). Using a variety of predetermined stategies, portfolio
insurance was supposed to "hedge" market risks, minimizing or nearly
eliminating risk in return for minor limits on the portfolio's growth
potential.
Technology is the key player in the development of new markets.
Although futures contracts (a contract for the purchase or delivery of
something at a price and date set in the contract) have been around for
years, selling stock indexes and futures contracts on stock indexes are a
relatively new phenomenon. These new markets were created because the
speed of transactions was icreased to near instantly. Without computers,
index arbitraging would be impossible. The role of technology in the
creation and execution of these markets in relation to the 1987 crash will
be discussed in more detail later.
Greed is also a motivating factor in the markets. Much of the money
made in the markets has little to do with long term growth and performance
of stocks but with financial gimmicks such as arbitraging. Although this
provides the markets with needed liquidity, we will examine what happens
when the gimmicks fail and the liquidity runs dry. What does the public at
large think of the stock market? The reaction from the "man (or women) on
the street" will also be briefly looked at.
On Black Monday, the Dow dropped over 500 points. Yet unlike 1929,
the economy did not collapse. Some people wondered why didn't the economy
fall apart? There are a number of theories and no one can so for sure why
exactly it didn't collapse. However, here are some of the ideas:
*Few individuals had sizable investments in the stock market. "To
evaluate Black Monday's impact on indivual householders, Avery and
Kennickell spread the markets 22 percent decline evenly among the
stockholders. They concluded that slightly more than 3 percent of all
households would have suffered a loss greater than 5 percent of their net
worth." (Waldrop 11) According to Judith Waldrop, only 1 percent of
households have stockholdings in excess of half their worth. (11)
*The margin used to purchase stocks in 1987 was substantially higher
than in 1929. Stock purchasers often buy on margin, borrowing a certain
amount of money to help pay for the stock. In 1929, there was a ten
percent margin, where only ten percent of the value of the stock had to be
paid for in cash. When the stock's value decreased, brokers asked buyers
for more money or securities pledged to back the magin because the value
of the stock went down. In 1987, the minimum margin was 25 percent. This
may have helped lessen the losses of people who could not meet a 10
percent margin in a declining market. Still, there were many traders and
brokers who could not meet this margin call and were forced to sell the
stocks at a loss, adding to the downward spiral.
In today's market, the individual investor plays only a minor role.
While it is true that the individual investor may not be affected much by
a market crash, the large corporations and mutual funds that pool
resources were greatly affected. Of course, they are made up of individual
investors.
There is one reason that hasn't been mentioned as much about why the
market did not just totally disintegrate. On Tuesday, October 20th with
the New York Stock Exchange near closure, the MMI (Major Market Index) on
the American Stock Exchange surged upwards by 90 points. The MMI is made
up of 20 of the best blue chip stocks that make up the Dow Jones
industrial average. This surge gave Wall Street the glimmer of hope it
needed, and the Dow Jones climbed quickly by 126 points.
The Securities and Exchange Commission stated "While the rise in the
MMI appears to have had a psychological impact on stock prices, it appears
to have had no direct effect on trading. " (Arbel, Kaff 107) Many people
beleive otherwise. The MMI is a widely repected but relatively small
index, meaning it would not be that difficult for the big money firms to
manipulate the index in the hope of restarting the bull market.
Tim Metz, a veteran market observer for The Wall Street Journal,
believes that NYSE president John Phelan Jr. and the specialists secretly
worked with the Fed, the SEC and the White House to pull the Dow out of
it's nosedive. (Metz 251) Metz notes that the major studies of the stock
market crash do not raise that question. "It will seem a decision has been
made at the highest levels that, even in America, some questions are best
not asked. Speaking only of the odd MMI futires trading, Bart Naylor, an
investigator for the Senate Banking Commitee, will state the dilemma that
applies to all of today's strange happenings: 'This is tricky,' he will
say. 'You don't want to put people in jail for saving the market.' " (Metz
251)
On October 7, 1987, the stock market had dropped 190 points. While
this was a warning sign, most people remained bullish on the economy.
After the 7th, the market rebounded until October 29th. Many people have
suggested that the crash was a natural turn of events, that the market was
simply overvalued and the crash was the the market's way of revaluating
the stock prices. However, when the events of October 19 and 20 are looked
at, it does not appear to be a market undergoing an orderly revaluation
but a market out of control taking panic stricken brokers and shareholders
along for the ride.
"'This is a good bye opportunity,' a friend on Wall Street was saying
three weeks ago as the Dow Jones Industrial Average started to slip.
'It's good bye house, good bye car good bye bonus.'" (Crudele 39) John
Crudele's anecdote is humourous. But on that day very few people were
laughing.
Various theories have been mentioned about why the stock market
plunged. Although books and perodicals differ in the complexity of their
explanations, they do agree on a some basic ideas:
Herd like instincts among the big money institutions.
Computer technology that lets traders mindlessly buy and sell huge
stock portfolios as if they were bushels of wheat.
Untried and misguided trading and hedging strategies that many
investment pros use in place of common sense. (Kosnett 41)
These ideas are basically agreed on by a majority of people who examined
the crash. Some will dispute the second and third statements. Opponents
say that people control the computers and that people would adjust the
computer program that buys and sells securities. This may be true for some
brokers. This paper will show however that even to these brokers who
usually retain control over their computers, under the condistions of the
crash even their computers were out of control.
How did it all begin? We begin by stating that the market was
overinflated. How high can stock prices go? Many people wondered if the
economy was beginning to reach it's limit after 5 years of expansion. Many
investors were on the brink of selling as soon as stock prices began to
decline just a little.
How did the prices get so high in the first place? It begins with the
whole mindset of the 1980's. The rage of the eighties was mergers.
(Otherwise known as hostile takeovers.) Corporate raiders such as T. Boone
Pickens would find a company with a stock that they felt was undervalued
and attempt to acquire it. They would finance this by issuing junk bonds.
These risky bonds paid a high amount of interest to the bearer. Much of
the collateral needed for the bonds was provided by the cash flow and
value of the company to be acquired. After the company was acquired, the
new management would dismantle the corporation, selling off many of the
assets. The idea was that the company was worth much more in little pieces
than together. These raiders made millions. Because the raiders needed to
acquire enough shares to control the company at all costs, they paid a
premium price for the stock. These corporate takeovers pushed the stock
value ever upwards.
Another problem in the years that led up to the crash was the extreme
pressure on the money managers to produce, profitably and immediately.
Harvard professor Jeffrey Glauber states "There is tremendous pressure on
money managers to perform better than our peers. This pressure will
continue to lead them to look for short performance. They'll continue to
act in an herdlike manner." (Kosnett 40, 41)
As was mentioned before, the individual investor is becoming rarer on
Wall Street. Much of the money is now invested in mutual funds by big time
money managers. They feel extreme pressure to produce in the short term.
This is a fundamental difference in the way stocks are invested today
compared to years ago. Years ago the brokers or inverstor would look at
the financial position of the company and it's potential for long term
growth. Today, most money managers and investors are looking at the short
term. It almost doesn't matter what the stock is, just that at this moment
it may be undervalued and if purchased now it can be sold for a profit a
week later. This earns money for the mutual fund, but it does not
contibute to the nations' economic growth. It is earnings on paper only.
With the advent of computers and the ability to simeltaneously execute
transactions, money managers can bounce back and forth between currency
exchanges, the New York Stock Exchange and the futures markets. Index
arbitraging is widespread. (This is where the instead of buying stock an
investor will buy an option to buy or sell a stock index for a
predetermined price for a specified period of time.)
A stock index is a basket of stocks based usually on the Standard and
Poor's 500. This way, with diversity in well known stocks, the index will
be less prone to major up and downs in value. An index option though, is
merely another excercise in paper earnings. It must be pointed out that an
option has value, but not the value of the stock itself. It is not a
stock. For example, it does not pay dividends and it does not give one a
voice in the running of a corporation.
Portfolio insurance is always mentioned as one of the major cuases of
the market crash. Portfolio insurance is really a number of strategies
used to "insure" an investment. It is a fromula used for buying or selling
stocks when prices reach certain paramenters. These preset limits are
controlled by computers. Portfolio insurance led to riskier than ususual
investment strategies, because brokers felt that their investments were
"hedged" (limited risk). They felt they could invest more capital in the
market because of this limited risk.
How did the market begin to unravel? It crumbled from a lack of
coordination and the use of computers in transacting stock. Kenneth
Liebler, president of the American Stock Exchange explains the lack of
coordination: "One of the problems of the crash was that the various
financial marketplaces all operate on different rules. Each market
operates in it's best interests, within the regulation that is prescribed
for it..."
"...this lack of coordination can itself lead to dangerous instability.
Decisions that are made in the context of individual market regulations
that meet the needs of its' customers may create pressures and
difficulties in other markets. " (Liebler 10) Although actions in the AMEX
or Chicago Mercantile Exchange can afect the New York Stock Exchange, each
has different proceedures, and different authorities decide whether to
close the market or stay open. This lack of coordiantion only leads to
trhe confusion.
Earlier I mentioned that the computers that traded stocks were out of
control on "Black Monday." This computer trding is known as "program
trading." Many of these programs execute trades automatically. Others wiat
for the command of the broker. Either way, the computers were out of
control and the market was breaking down by the minute. Here's why:
As stock prices tumbled, computers that were programmed to sell
shares when the stock reached a certain level sold huge quantities of
stock. This in turn, helped push the value of the stock lower. More
computers began to execute trades to sell their stock, as prices began to
rapidly roll downhill. What about the traders that did not have their
computers automatically selling stock? They looked at hteir screens and
saw a certain price for a stock, so they may have deceided to sell. Lets
suppose that broker A decides to cut his losses and sell stock PZD. The
stock began trading at $125 a share and now has dropped to $100 a share.
Broker A puts the sell order in the DOT (designated order turnaround)
system. The DOT is so overwhelmed with sell orders, it's mechanical
printers can't keep up with rapidly changing prices. As a result, that
$100 share listing was out of date, at that time the stock may have fallen
to $90 and by the time the sale was executed the stock could be $85. So,
the broker figures that he sold that stock for $100. He is wrong by $15 a
share. Now multiply that by 1000 shares!
Tim Metz descibes the chaos on Wall Street with the DOT system. "In a
particualrly frightening snafu, the electronic messages confirming the
specialists' execution of bettween 5,000 and 9,000 trades will never get
to the member firms that originated them. Instead, they will disappear
from the NYSE computers' memory banks without a trace, and the originating
firms won't know for days whether they were executed or not." (Metz 132)
Slowly, brokers and companies realize they are trading blind. You
can't trade when you're unable to put a market value on the stock? The
price keeps falling, and they don't even know what the price is. When this
happens, the computer gets overloaded with sell orders and can't execute
them because there are no buyers. How can you buy when you don't know what
the market value is? "Excahange officials and member firm trading
executives alike begin to worry that some of the busiest companies are now
in effect trading blind- without reliable information on just what their
positions are. This raises the chilling possissiblilty that when the trade
confirmations are sorted out days from now, some major particpants might
learn they are insolvent. 'If we are going to lose somebody big, it was
going to show up in clearancer and settlement,' an NYSE official will
later say. 'And it's a miracle we didn't lose one of the big firms.' "
(Metz 132)
Joseph Grundfest concurs: "...there were substantial periods of time
on Black Monday when trades did not have accurate information on current
prices and the status of orders they had already entered. If you wanted to
trade, you didn't know the price that your order was executed for quite a
while" (Grundfest 18)
Academia, which was responsible for creating many of the formulas
used in stock index options and portfolio insurance, agreed with the
computer problems and the reasons that it happened. Bruce Greenwald and
Jeremy Stein, in the Journal of Business state that the "transitional
risk" (what price a trade would be executed at) was too high. "...this
type of breakdown can prevent the normal Walrasian adjustment mechanism
from working. Under normal circumstances , 'value buyers' may be deterred
from placing orders because they view the 'transitional risk' as
exteremely high- they are very unsure as to the prices at which their
orders will be executed. (Greenwald, Stein 443, 444)
Naturally, after the crash was over, President Reagan created a task
force to try to determine what happened. The report, commonly known as the
Brady commission had this to say about to crippled computer system: "On
Monday, orders for 396 million shares were entered into the New York Stock
Exchange's DOT system. This unprecedented traffic at times overwhelemed
the mechanical printers that print DOT orders at certain trading posts,
resulting in signifigant delays in executing market orders and in entering
limit orders. These delays meant that market orders were executed at
prices very different from those in effect when the orders were placed."
(Arbel, Kaff 80)
American Stock Exchange President Kenneth Liebler says that
portfolio insurance was overused. An invester can't possibly "hedge" his
entire portfolio. Some risk is naturally inherent in the markets. "...it
is clear that portfolio insurance works only if relatively few people use
it at any one time. This is analogues to what happens at banks. No bank in
the world, no matter what it's net worth, can sustain 50 percent of it's
depositors asking for cash on the same day. If half of it's depositors
want to cash in on their accounts, the bank could not remain liquid..."
(Liebler 12) In the same way, the market could not remain liquid.
Computers executed trades so fast, a prices unknoewn to the sellers that
soon all figures were unreliable and the market broke down. Liquidity had
absolutely dried up.
Obviousely, the crash did not destroy the economy. Yet it had some
major effects on the financial markets. One of the major effects was the
decrease in investment in the stock market by individual investors. They
were scared off by the suddden crash. "As more investors withdraw from the
market, trading volume is sagging. Lower volume means less liquidity, the
ability to execute transactions without advesely affecting prices. In very
liquid markets, investors can place orders at the going price and be
reasonable sure that they'll buy or sell at the same price. Today, that's
much less the case." (Laderman 60, 61)
Douglass McIntyre has suggested that the general investing public has
stayed away from the markets because the market is not in tune with
general economic realities. He says the public does not trust the market
and that few brokers ever asked their clients about their reaction to the
crash or how it might affect their investment philosophy. (McIntyre 124)
Given the small amount of the American public that invests in the market,
I do not agree that the public does not trust the marketrplace, rather I
would suggest that the general public is not aware of the marketplace.
After the crash, financial experts beleived that the market would have to
work extra hard to win back public confidence. This is not true. They
would have to work extra hard to win back their clients' confidence, but
the public confidence will remain the same. (This will be examined in the
section on the media.)
Willaim Sheline believed that the crash was merely a correction in
the economy. A revaluation of stock prices. "The crash turns out to be a
correction rather than a slump." (Sheline 84) What is most interesting is
Sheline's statement about lack of confidence in the market. (From Fortune
magazine, October 24, 1988, a year after the crash.) "Is there anything
left of the stock markets fabled value as an economic indicator? Yes wise
heads say, even though it seems to call a recession that hasn't happened
yet." (Sheline 84) A recession was on the way, although it was still
over two years in the future.
The Brady Comission report was over 800 pages long, detailing causes
and potential soultions. The stock market was all over the media and on
the minds of Congress. Wholesale changes were mentioned. They never
happened. The one major change that took place was the instiution of
"circut breakers" that would interupt trading on the NYSE when the prices
dropped in specified amount in a given period of time. Congress examined
the market, and did nothing.
Why did Congress do nothing? The answer is rather simple. The old
cliche "if it ain't broke don't fix it" describes the mentality rather
well. After the crash, everybody was very concerned about the economy. The
great communicator, President Reagan said the economy was sound, that
program trading had caused the crash. (Although from his press conference
it was apparent he didn't even look at the Brady Commission report. It did
not say that program trading caused the crash.)
The stock market rebounded nicely from the crash and soon all was
forgotten. It just didn't seem important to make changes when the market
was doing well. This ignored the fact that the fundamental flaws in the
system still exisited and that it was (and still is) possible to have
another crash. Sarah Bartlett explains about the attitude of the
government just six months after the crash. "Six months later the
temptation is to shed the memories and to celebrate survival. The 508
point drop in the stock market produced a host of dire predictions. But
whehn many of them failed to meterialize it was taken as proof that the
crash, though startlling, didn't really matter. (Bartlett 55)
Chicago Futures Trading Commission Chairman James M. Stone had this
to say about the crash and it's effects: "The fuirther we get away from
October 19th, the less chance we'll learn from it." (Yang 63) Now that it
has been nearly five years since the market crash and we can see more
clearly the results of the crash. It is intersting to see what people
predicted in the aftermath of the crash and see if held true. Sarah
Bartlett forecasted with amazing accuracy. "But the more the economy
rebounds, and the more optomism spreads, the easier it is to renege on
earlier promises. Immediately after the crash, in contrast, everyone
strove to be on their best behavior. Congress and administration produced
a budget, though skimpy, had a air of fiscal responsibility. Politicuans
swore off protectionism. Even computer driven program traders held their
fire. Slowly but surely, the good intentions are wearing off. Progress on
the buget deficit is nil, and no presidential candidate is willing to
discuss any prescriptions in depth." (Bartlett 55) As the 1992
Presidential election approaches, it is intersting to note that the budget
deficit is the biggest it's even been and the leading candidate in the
polls for president (Ross Perot) is a candidate who has yet to take any
positons on amy issues. Some things just don't seem to change. Six
months or five years later, the crash just really didn't matter.
The media played an important role in the stock crash of 1987.
Although the average person had up untl then been relatively unaware what
was happening on Wall Street, one could not help but notice after October
19th. Before the 19th, Portfolio Trading was a nearly unknown term
outside of Wall Street. After the 19th, the word was on everybody's lips.
To the media, this was the story of the year. It was tangible and unusual-
a major crash. It was also exciting, unlike another continuing fiscal
crisis- the Federal budget deficit. The deficit is always there, and to
the media it is not too interesting to report on. The crash was
different. This could be pulitzer prize winning material.
The crash was reported throuout the full spectrum of the media, from
the TV network news to the talk shows to The Wall Street Journal, to
scholarly journals and popular magazines such as Newsweek. In this paper,
a wide variety of sources were examined.
The media was far more interested in the Stock Market Crash than the
general public. This gave the media a chance to demonstrate it's
competence and for some people, a chance at career advancement. Arbel and
Kaff explain: "Television networks, the Associated Press and United Press
Internation wire services and news syndicate services operated by the New
York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and other major newspapers
filled television news shows and newspapers, big and small, with an
avalanche of Wall Street reports, big headlines! front page news!
Television Specials!... ...It was another media blitz! It won pulitzer
prizes for two enterprising reporters. But for many Americans, Wall Street
was another world removed from Main Street. And not the one they
necessarilty respected." (Arbel, Kaff 147) Some Americans didn't even
have the money to pay their immeediate bills, much less have extra money
to gamble in the Stock Market. To them, all this media coverage must have
seemed like another planet. For most Americans, the crash did not have
much of an effect, so they really didn't care about it, in spite of the
media coverage.
Dominic Lasorsa and Stephen Reese did an interesting study on media
coverage of the stock market. In "News Source Use in the Crash of 1987: a
Study of Four National Media" from Journalism Quarterly, Lasora and Reese
examine coverage of the stock market by the CBS Evening News, The New York
Times, The Wall Street Journal and Newsweek.
The sources of the various media differed. Government sources
mentioned causes (such as the national debt) while business and lobbyists
focused on effects. In the print media, Wall Street sources were the most
widely used while at CBS government sources were the primary source.
(LaSorsa, Reese 60) An important reason to examine what sources are used
is the idea of "media convergence," the tendency for all the media to
focus on one story at a time. This may encourage the herd mentality where
one media source looks to another for guidence. (LaSorsa, Reese 62) The
media favored high prestige sources, such as goverment officials, exchange
presidents or high ranking officers of brokerage houses. Doctors from
various universities were popular in interviews also. In this type of
reporting, it is important to get the high prestige sources. Everyday
common people only get into the news in extraordinary events, such as a
car accident or a heroic rescue. (The girl who fell into the well in Texas
and was saved happened at the same time of the market crash.) According
to Lasora and Reese, the public views of the crash would have been shaped
as much by the sources cited as the medium read or viewed. (LaSorsa and
Reese 63) There is a tendency among the public to take what is said by a
high profile person as absolute truth. ("If Henry Kissenger said it on the
CBS Evening News, then it must be true.")
Naturally, the least in depth of the media is television. Although it
has the ability to reach the most people any any one time, a thirty second
sound bite can make or break a career. ("read my lips- no new taxes!" or
"yeah I tried it, but I didn't inhale.") I would be willing to predict
that many people won't vote for Bill Clinton simply one the basis of that
one statement.
Out of all the media, television uses the most unattributed sources.
This is typical of its lack of depth, as table 4 demonstrates.
Table 4 - Source Affiliations by Medium and Percent
Times Journal Newsweek CBS
17 7 15 44
- taken from LaSorsa and Reese p. 68
Another example of televisions coverages lack of depth: "The sources
also differed considerably in the divesrsity of opinion expressed about
the causes. The Evening News sources made no mention of half of the
reasons for the crash. By contrast, the Times made mention of all but
three." (LaSorsa, Reese 69)
LaSorsa and Reese elaborate on the theory of media convergence. Theyt
beleive that a consesus may develop in sector specific media like The Wall
Street Journal, and then be picked up by a broader based medium such as
The New York Times. In turn, the newsmagazines and networks look to those
elite media for guidence in their own coverage. (LaSorsa, Reese 71)
Thus, it appears that one elite media sets the tone and agenda and
the other media follow. The most mainstream media, television looks to the
other media for guidence and discusses the proiblem with the least depth.
The public who is not very well aware of the market watches televidsion,
and gets its' very limited understanding from TV, if they pay attention at
all. The results of the public opinion polls suggest that along with viwer
and reading patterns, the publics perception of the stock market has
changed very little. They are just not interested. A Business Week/Harris
Poll taken after the market crash shows that the publics view of the
economy hasn't diminished, and that the market crash did not have much
effect on the general public. (Jackson 59)
Can the market prevent another crash? The market can take steps to
prevent the a crash, but has largely ignored the flaws that led to the
crash in the first place. Joseph Grundfest states some of the ideas that
were never implemented: "...regulators can help prevent anotehr Black
Monday, but only if they act to remove serious impediments in the market
process by improving imformation flow, increasing capacity and enhancing
liquidity. As was stated before, most of these stepsd were never taken.
As time goes on and the lure of profits keeps getting stronger, the
market crash will be percieved as just a distant menory. Someday, some
unfortunate crisis might refresh the financial markets' memories. Martin
Mayer, from his book Markets sum up the situation very well. "One never
need worry about an adequate suppply of greed, like all the vices, it's
always there. The willingness to acknowlege error however, is always
scarce. What went wrong in the 1980's was the constant construction on
Wall Street, in Chicago, in Washington- and to rather different ends, in
London and Tokyo and Frankfurt- of labyrinthine structure difficult
topenetrate and understand that permitted the politicians and bankers and
traders to deny the reality of their own mistakes. October 19th should
have chilled the fantasies. It did, but only briefly. The losses have been
taken, but not internalized. The denials persist." (Mayer 272)
Bibliography
**Editors Note: This paper was orginally written in 1992 in Wordstar 4.0 format on a Kapro 10 microcomputer
running the CP/M operating system. Since then, the paper has been translated into ASCII, then Wordstar 5.0
for DOS format, then Lotus Ami Pro, Lotus Word Pro and now HTML. Somewhere in five moves, four different
cities, multiple formats and five years, the separate file containing the Bibliography is missing. It is too difficult
too find out exactly who all the authors in this paper are. Somewhere, I believe there exists a hard copy of the
paper. If I find it, I will post the bibliography to the paper.
-MD, March 8, 1997.